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Abstract
The prime objective of this study is to investigate the legitimate role of corporate 
boards and corporate social responsibility on the performance of Malaysian listed 
companies during 2006–2017. Elements of corporate boards include board size, 
board independence and board diversity, whereas corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) dimensions constitute marketplace, environment, community and 
workplace. Both accounting-based (return on assets [ROA], return on equity 
[ROE]) and market-based (earnings per share [EPS]) performance measures 
have been employed for measuring performance. Pooled ordinary least squares 
method (OLS) and multiple regressions are used to estimate the dataset. Findings 
reveal larger board size and higher board independence positively affect firm 
performance and significantly legitimise the board role in firms. However, the 
presence of women on Malaysian corporate boards does not legitimate the 
performance due to their lower percentage on board, hence insignificantly 
affecting firm value. Additionally, out of four CSR dimensions, only marketplace is 
positively and significantly related to EPS and negatively and significantly related 
to ROA. Conversely, environment, community and workplace are insignificantly 
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related to all performance measures, leaving firms in a questionable legitimate 
state. This study embraces support from agency theory, resource dependence 
theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. However, this research raises 
questionable insights for regulatory bodies and academicians in the form of 
corporate legitimacy.
Keywords
Corporate boards, corporate legitimacy, corporate social responsibility, firm 
performance, Securities Commission Malaysia
Introduction
Role of corporate boards is abundantly highlighted in the past, after the financial 
crisis, to emphasise their substantial impact on firm performance (Farhan, Obaid, 
& Azalan, 2017; Mishra & Kapil, 2017; Ofoeda, 2017; Sheikh & Karim, 2015; 
Yasser, Mamun, & Rodrigs, 2017). Correspondingly, Malaysia suffered the same 
fate when many organisations crumpled from lack of appropriate governance and 
social responsibility practices. Although multiple Malaysian codes on corporate 
governance (MCCG) have been provided over the years (MCCG, 2000, 2007, 
2012, 2017), there are inconsistent compliance practices still existing in listed 
companies. Statistics provided by Securities Commission Malaysia (2018) 
revealed action had been taken against 20 criminal cases in 2018. Meanwhile, the 
chief issues submitted to the Commission were as follows: presenting unaudited 
financial statements, misleading information of company about its financials, 
fictitious purchase of assets, director of a company doing business illegally, 
executive of a company using organisational resources for paying his own debts, 
and reporting fabricated and deceptive information about a company. These facts 
expose malpractices of corporate boards in terms of weak internal control 
mechanisms, less efficient monitoring and fallacious disclosure practices by the 
firms in the annual reports, demonstrating shaky compliance of corporate 
governance codes in Malaysia.
Significant findings of Klynveld, Peat, Marwick and Goerdeler (KPMG, 2013) 
for fraud, bribery and corruption cases in Malaysia state that the quantum of fraud 
has increased over the last 3 years with more sophistication. Moreover, frauds are 
increasingly becoming industry aligned and critically targeted to certain business 
processes. Many believe that fraud, specifically bribery and corruption, is a major 
problem for businesses in Malaysia, while several others opine that fraud is an 
inevitable cost of doing business in their organisations. Notably, these enormous 
issues of fraud, bribery and corruption raise the questions of legitimate role of 
corporate boards and their influence on company performance in Malaysia.
Notwithstanding MCCG, organisations in Malaysia are also lacking in 
conforming Bursa Malaysia corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure 
framework (2006) where companies are directed to disclose their social 
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responsibility practices in annual reports on account of marketplace, environment, 
community and workplace dimensions. Evidently, the legitimate compliance of 
socially responsible practices in Malaysian firms has created a riddle in the minds 
of stakeholders. Therefore, the question surfaces whether firms are performing 
their CSR activities for the society or for hiding their financial malfeasance?
In this way, several studies unveiled the interrelationship between corporate 
governance and CSR (Gill, 2008; Jamali, Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008; Jones & 
Thompson, 2012) but their combined legitimate effect on firm performance is still 
undiscovered. Nonetheless, there are studies that independently examine the 
impact of corporate governance (Bhatt & Bhatt, 2017; Ofoeda, 2017; Sheikh & 
Karim, 2015; Yasser et al., 2017) and CSR on firm performance (Feng, Wang, & 
Kreuze, 2017; Lin & Amin, 2016; Makanyeza, Chitambara, & Kakava, 2017; 
Yusoff & Adamu, 2016), but, the empirical support for their integrated and 
legitimate influence on performance is yet unresolved. Moreover, this study 
attempts to settle agency conflicts between shareholders and board of directors in 
terms of their legitimate effect on firm value. Additionally, this study incorporates 
the presumptions of legitimacy theory and agency cost theory for explaining the 
relationships between CSR practices and firm performance where managers 
overinvest in the CSR activities to camouflage their financial delinquencies.
Thus, main findings of the study reveal a significant positive impact of board 
size on return on equity (ROE) and a positive effect of board independence on 
return on assets (ROA) congruent with resource dependence theory; however 
board independence is negatively related to ROE based on the presumptions of 
agency theory, whereas board diversity is found to be insignificantly related to all 
measures of performance. Furthermore, only one CSR dimension, that is, 
marketplace, is negatively related to ROA and positively related to EPS, whereas 
the remaining dimensions indicate insignificant results with all performance 
measures. These results indicate that Malaysian listed companies need to know 
their legitimate compliance of corporate governance code, and firms must be 
cautious of their CSR strategies and policies to monitor where firms’ resources are 
being vested in the name of performing CSR activities. Therefore, this study 
leaves a significant impression for regulatory bodies of Malaysia, policymakers, 
investors, managers and other stakeholders for gauging the compliance of MCCG 
and CSR framework and their impacts on firm performance.
The second section in this study presents literature review of earlier empirical 
studies followed by data, variables and methodology in the third section. The 
fourth section provides empirical results along with discussion in the fifth section. 
Finally, the sixth section presents concluding remarks.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
This section provides review of earlier empirical studies where elements of 
corporate boards and CSR are presented along with their respective hypotheses.
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Board Size
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) claims larger the board, 
more human assets it contains for efficient organisational performance. 
Importantly, there are empirical evidences centralised on resource-based view, 
asserting larger boards bring higher returns, specifically when firms are facing 
environmental turbulence (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Similarly, Williams, Fadil, and 
Armstrong (2005) claimed larger boards have more human assets to monitor the 
board in a behavioural manner. However, there is a trade-off between the costs 
associated with larger or smaller boards within a specified board size. Even so, 
there are extensive empirical findings related to board size and firm performance. 
For instance, Yasser et al. (2017) explored the relationship between board 
demographics and firm financial performance for KSE-100 indexed public listed 
companies of Pakistan and reported a positive relationship between board size 
and firm performance. Similarly, Ofoeda (2017) documented a linear relationship 
between board size and firm performance of Ghanaian non-bank financial 
institutions. Finally, Sheikh and Karim (2015) also found a direct relationship 
between board size and performance of commercial banks in Pakistan. Thus, for 
maintaining the corporate legitimacy of firm processes, it is expected that larger 
board size must positively influence the firm performance. Therefore it is 
hypothesised as follows:
H1: A larger board size positively affects firm performance.
Board Independence
Generally, outside directors are appointed on board to bring critical success to the 
organisational processes and increase firm performance due to their independent 
monitoring role towards firms. Despite their legitimate role, Fama (1980) argued 
that more independent directors on the board act as professional referees and work 
for value maximisation of shareholders. Thus, independent directors are invited 
onto the board for supervision on behalf of shareholders. In the same way, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) stressed that a higher proportion of independent 
directors is directly associated with higher returns. Correspondingly, Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) revealed higher fraction of independent directors on the board is 
linked to greater firm value. Chen (2011) suggested that a firm should include 
more independent directors on the board to improve the quality and effectiveness 
of corporate governance. Alternatively, Wu and Wu (2014) maintained that 
excessive involvement of independent directors in daily affairs of organisations 
may restrict the managers to perform their functions deliberately, which negatively 
affects firm performance. On account of legitimate role of independent directors 
towards firm performance, it is hypothesised as follows:
H2: Higher board independence positively affects firm performance.
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Board Diversity
Various studies in the field of corporate governance have uplifted a significant 
interest on women’s representation on board of directors as a result of the policies 
and guidelines for good governance introduced in many countries. The basic 
assumption behind women’s representation on board is women, due to their 
diverse skill base, experience and knowledge, bring higher returns for firms (Kiel 
& Nicholson, 2003). Nevertheless, it is claimed that board diversity is an indicator 
of CSR as it generates greater creativity in decision-making (Erhardt, Werbel, & 
Shrader, 2003). Furthermore, board diversity contributes to several diverse 
perspectives to debates, that is, raising new concerns and providing new 
sensitivities to the board discussions (Burke, 1997).
The current Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2017) has 
implicated 30 per cent women’s representation on board by large companies. 
Several studies examined the impact of board diversity on firm performance. For 
example, Solakoglu and Demir (2016) studied the effect of gender diversity on 
performance of Turkish firms during 2002–2006 and found a significant 
relationship between gender diversity and firms targeting local markets, financial 
sector firms and family or block-owned firms. However, overall findings suggest 
a weak linkage between gender diversity and performance of firms in Turkey. 
Moreover, Abdullah and Ismail (2016) investigated whether women’s 
representation on board and on audit committees is associated with the earnings 
management practice of non-finance firms listed on Bursa Malaysia during 
2008–2011. They reported women’s representation neither on board nor on audit 
committee is linked to the practice of earnings management. Finally, Cabrera-
Fernández, Martínez-Jiménez, and Hernández-Ortiz (2016) also documented an 
insignificant relationship between board diversity and firm performance. Since 
MCCG (2017) incriminates 30 per cent women on board, expecting the legitimate 
role of board diversity, it is assumed that 30 per cent women’s representation on 
corporate boards will positively affect firm performance in Malaysian listed firms. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesised as follows:
H3: Board diversity (30% women on board) positively affects firm performance.
Corporate Social Responsibility
In the present economic and social conditions, when the organisations operate in 
an increasingly turbulent environment, legitimacy becomes increasingly 
unstable. To survive this unpredictable environment, organisations should adhere 
to norms and overcome the superficial barriers raised by conformity (Suchman, 
1995). Along these lines, organisations must surpass a symbolic and inaccurate 
disclosure to a formal compliance disclosure in its effort to gain and maintain 
legitimacy. Similarly, Porter and Kramer (2006) argued that companies should 
identify, prioritise and address those social issues that matter the most, or upon 
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which they can make the largest impact. Hence, authors recommended firms to 
start with common social impacts simply by being good citizens, improving 
relationships with local authorities and bringing pride to employees. Second, 
they should identify and mitigate the various forms of social harm arising out of 
their value chains.
While answering the question about measurement of CSR, Scott, Cocchi, and 
Gemmell (2014) claimed that aggregate measures of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
(KLD) are arithmetic tools with weaker statistical bases. More to the point, 
Paredes-Gazquez, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Cuesta-Gonzalez (2016) and 
Paruolo, Saisana, and Saltelli (2013) mentioned that weighing of indicators is the 
main concern, so CSR must be measured in disaggregated terms. However, 
Ahamed, Almsafir, and Al-Smadi (2014) asserted that corporations of Malaysia 
need to disclose their CSR activities based on four dimensions, namely 
environment, workplace, community and marketplace. Similarly, Yusoff and 
Adamu (2016) employed these four CSR dimensions in their study and found a 
direct association between CSR dimensions and performance variables.
Furthermore, Makanyeza et al. (2017) investigated seven CSR dimensions and 
their impact on firm performance using both accounting and market-based 
performance measures. The seven CSR dimensions comprise employee relations, 
customer relations, environmental relations, diversity relations, community 
relations, supplier relations and investor relations. Yet, authors found only four 
dimensions that affect firm performance explicitly—employee relations, customer 
relations, community relations and investor relations.
Consequently, it is hypothesised as follows:
H4: Corporate social responsibility positively affects firm performance (stakeholder 
theory) and negatively affects firm performance (legitimacy theory).
Data, Variables and Methodology
Data
The purpose of this study is to examine the legitimate role of corporate boards and 
CSR practices on the performance of Malaysian listed companies during 
2006–2017. For estimation purpose, unbalanced panel data were mainly collected 
from the annual reports of listed companies of Malaysia using content analysis; 
however, performance data of listed companies were sourced from Datastream. A 
total 845 companies were listed on Bursa Malaysia, but the data of 631 firms have 
been estimated with about 5904 firm-year observations for the period 2006–2017.
Variables
This study contains elements of corporate boards, namely board size, board 
independence and board diversity, whereas CSR dimensions include 
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marketplace, environment, community and workplace to investigate their 
legitimate impact on firm performance. However, the study employs both 
accounting-based (ROA, ROE) and market-based (EPS) performance measures. 
Moreover, two control variables, that is, firm size and leverage, are employed to 
control firm-specific characteristics. Table 1 presents operational definition and 
measurement of variables.
Table 1. Operational Definition and Measurement of Variables
Variables PROXY Definition
Dependent variables
Return on assets ROA
it
Profit before taxes to total assets.
Return on equity ROE
it
Profit before taxes to stockholders 
equity.
Earnings per share EPS
it
Profit before taxes to total 





Log of firm’s board size. Board size 
is the total number of board of 
directors of a company.
Board independence BIND
it 
Proportion of independent 




Proportion of women on board to 
total number of board directors. 
Corporate social responsibility practices:
Marketplace MKT
it 
A dummy variable 1 if requirements 




A dummy variable 1 if requirements 




A dummy variable 1 if requirements 




A dummy variable 1 if requirements 





Natural logarithm of total assets.
Leverage LEV
it
Total liabilities to total assets. 
Source: The authors.
8 Indian Journal of Corporate Governance
Methodology
This study utilises pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and multiple regressions 
methods to examine the legitimate impact of corporate boards and CSR on firm 
performance. Regression equations are as follows:
ROAit = b0 + b1BSIZEit  + b2 BINDit  + b3BDIVit  + b4 MKTit  + b5ENVit + 






∑ + eit  (1)
ROEit  = b0  + b1BSIZEit  + b2 BINDit  + b3BDIVit  + b4 MKTit  + b5ENVit  + 






∑ + eit  (2)
EPSit = b0 + b1BSIZEit  + b2 BINDit  + b3BDIVit  + b4 MKTit  + b5ENVit + 






∑ + eit  (3)
where ROAit  is return on assets for ith company at time t, ROEit  is return on 
equity for ith company at time t, EPSit is earnings per share for ith company at 
time t, BSIZEit  is board size for ith company at time t, BINDit  is board 
independence for ith company at time t, BDIVit  is board diversity for ith company 
at time t, MKTit is marketplace dimension for ith company at time t, ENVit  is 
environment dimension for ith company at time t, COMMit  is community 
dimension for ith company at time t, WRKit  is workplace dimension for ith 
company at time t, Controlijt is the jth control variables for ith company at time t, 
b0  is the intercept, eit is the random error term for ith company at time t. b b1 8−
are the coefficients of concerned explanatory and control variables.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Table 2 presents mean values of variables included in the study where –0.002 
value of ROA reveals Malaysian firms are losing the profit of 0.002 cents for 
RM1 of total assets. Moreover, the median value of return on equity, that is, 3.98 
illustrates firms are gaining profit of RM3.98 for RM1 of total equity and figure 
of 0.12 for EPS denotes profit available for common shareholders. The average 
board size yields the value of 7.64, whereas board independence is 3.22, advocating 
50 per cent outsider directors’ representation of Malaysian company boards. 
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However, the average value of board diversity is 0.67, demonstrating an 
insignificant percentage of women presented on Malaysian boards. For CSR 
measures, marketplace dimension depicts the average value of 42.25 per cent, 
whereas for environment, community and workplace dimensions, the midpoint 
values are 64.83 per cent, 68.29 per cent, and 64.07 per cent, respectively. Finally, 
the mean firm size is 13.10 and leverage is at an average value of 42.68 per cent.
Additionally, figures of correlation matrix in Table 3 illustrate that the values 
of independent variables are reasonably small and leave no problem of 
multicollinearity among variables.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ROA
it
5904 –0.0024 1.5016 –48.226 10.756
ROE
it
5904 3.9849 33.284 –535.4 334.16
EPS
it
5904 0.1214 0.4225 –3.25 9.328
BSIZE
it
5904 7.6465 1.8645 3 15
BIND
it
5904 3.2261 0.9803 1 11
BDIV
it
5904 0.6783 0.8384 0 5
MKT
it
5904 0.4225 0.4940 0 1
ENV
it
5904 0.6483 0.4775 0 1
COMM
it
5904 0.6829 0.4653 0 1
WRK
it
5904 0.6407 0.4798 0 1
SIZE
it
5904 13.107 1.6863 7.6797 20.276
LEV
it
5904 0.4268 0.4014 0.0010 10.319
Source: Data analysis by the authors.
Regression Results
Three models were developed during the estimation process as presented in the 
regression equations. Empirical results exhibited in Table 4 denote that board size 
and board diversity are negatively linked to ROA but the relationships are 
insignificant, whereas board independence is significantly and positively related 
to ROA confirming hypothesis 2. Moreover, marketplace is negatively and 
significantly related to ROA, whereas environment, community and workplace 
are also negatively related to ROA but the relationships are insignificant. 
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Table 4. Effect of Explanatory Variables on Return on Assets (ROA
it
)
Variable Coefficients Std. Err. t-Statistic Probability
C –0.6480 0.1419 –4.57 0.000
BSIZE
it
–0.0166 0.0118 –1.40 0.161
BIND
it
0.0419 0.0222 1.89 0.059
BDIV
it
–0.0063 0.0214 –0.29 0.768
MKT
it
–0.0923 0.0484 –1.91 0.057
ENV
it
–0.0460 0.0829 –0.56 0.578
COMM
it
–0.0059 0.1033 –0.06 0.954
WRK
it
–0.0396 0.0767 –0.52 0.606
SIZE
it
0.1106 0.0119 9.28 0.000
LEV
it
–1.6600 0.0436 –38 0.000
R2 0.2038
Adjusted R2 0.2026 F-statistic 5.09
Root MSE 1.3409 Prob. (F-statistic) 0.0000
Source: Data analysis by the authors.
Table 5 gives the impact of explanatory variables on return on equity (ROEit) 
where regression results imply board size to be positively significant, with ROE 
confirming hypothesis 1. Meanwhile, board independence and board diversity are 
negatively associated with ROE but the significant outcome is observed by board 
independence only. In addition, marketplace, community and workplace are 
positively but insignificantly related to ROE, whereas environment is negatively 
and insignificantly related to ROE. Finally, firm size is positively and significantly 
linked to ROE, whereasleverage is negatively and significantly linked to ROE.
Table 5. Effect of Explanatory Variables on Return on Equity (ROE
it
)
Variable Coefficients Std. Err. t-Statistic Probability
C –40.652 3.4101 –11.92 0.000
BSIZE
it
1.3594 0.2832 4.80 0.000
BIND
it
–1.2922 0.5319 –2.43 0.015
BDIV
it
–0.6883 0.5111 –1.35 0.178
MKT
it
0.9918 1.1522 0.86 0.389
ENV
it
–1.2748 1.9708 –0.65 0.518
COMM
it
0.3098 2.4549 0.13 0.900
WRK
it
0.8153 1.8225 0.45 0.655
SIZE
it
4.0637 0.2960 13.73 0.000
LEV
it
–36.187 1.8645 –19.41 0.000
R2 0.1770
Adjusted R2 0.1466 F-statistic 5.83
Root MSE 0.1243 Prob. (F-statistic) 0.0000
Source: Data analysis by the author.
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Table 6. Effect of Explanatory Variables on Earnings Per Share (EPS
it
)
Variable Coefficients Std. Err. t-Statistic Probability
C –0.6541 0.0430 –15.20 0.000
BSIZE
it
0.0032 0.0036 0.91 0.365
BIND
it
0.0018 0.0067 0.28 0.781
BDIV
it
–0.0054 0.0065 –0.84 0.403
MKT
it
0.0257 0.0146 1.75 0.080
ENV
it
0.0320 0.0251 1.28 0.202
COMM
it
–0.0238 0.0313 –0.76 0.446
WRK
it
–0.0173 0.0232 –0.75 0.455
SIZE
it
0.0606 0.0036 16.77 0.000
LEV
it
–0.1201 0.0132 –9.06 0.000
R2 0.3862
Adjusted R2 0.3705 F-statistic 2.75
Root MSE 0.4067 Prob. (F-statistic) 0.0000
Source: Data analysis by the authors.
In the end, Table 6 presents the effect of independent variables on EPSit where 
results illustrate measures of corporate boards do not impact market-based 
performance measure. However, board size and board independence are positively 
related to EPS, whereas board diversity is negatively related to EPS. Marketplace 
and environment are positively related to EPS, but the relationship is only 
significant with marketplace. Alternatively, community and workplace are 
negatively and insignificantly associated with EPS. Ultimately, firm size is 
positively related to EPS, whereas leverage is negatively related to EPS.
Overall, board size is positively and significantly related to ROE (H1 accepted). 
Board independence is positively linked to ROA (H2 accepted) and negatively 
linked to ROE. Board diversity does not influence firm performance (H3 rejected). 
Marketplace dimension of CSR is significantly and negatively related to ROA, 
whereas it is positively related to EPS (H4 accepted). In addition, the remaining 
three dimensions of CSR, namely environment, community and workplace, are 
insignificantly related to all performance measures. For control variables, firm 
size is positively related to firm performance, whereas leverage is negatively 
related to firm performance.
Discussion on Empirical Results
This study examines the legitimising role of corporate boards and CSR on 
performance of Malaysian listed companies. Empirical results reveal a positive 
relationship between board size and ROE consistent with resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), which suggests a larger board fetches new 
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resources and expertise when an organisation faces uncertain and turbulent 
environment (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Moreover, Hypothesis 1 of the study 
assumes a larger board size fully legitimises the role of board of directors in 
organisations. Accordingly, the study embraces the predictions of resource-based 
view where bigger board size brings pool of skills to the firm for its survival in a 
competitive world. However, the positive relationship between board size and 
firm performance is akin to Bhatt and Bhatt (2017), Ofoeda (2017) and Sheikh 
and Karim (2015).
Similarly, positive relationship between board independence and ROA 
reinforces the predictions of resource dependence theory, asserting independent 
boards have more efficient human resources to monitor and control the 
organisational processes. Moreover, higher board independence legitimises the 
board role to closely examine and observe the managerial actions that seem 
impossible in the absence of independent board. Yet, the positive relationship 
between board independence and firm performance is consistent with Sheikh and 
Karim (2015) and Nyamongo and Temesgen (2013).
Alternatively, board independence negatively affects ROE following 
presumptions of agency theory contending higher board independence raises 
conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, elevating the critical 
nature of legitimised role of independent boards. Nevertheless, this wavering 
nature of legitimised board role is nurtured by the fluctuation in organisational 
power and authority over its stakeholders. Suitably, the direct relationship between 
legitimacy and power forces the organisation to take into consideration the 
approval or disapproval of the stakeholders in the decision-making process. 
Moreover, higher board independence hinders the daily operations of managers 
due to unnecessary interference in the workflow of organisations. However, this 
inverse relationship is also observed by Wu and Wu (2014).
Correspondingly, board diversity does not affect firm performance due to the 
minute proportion of women directors on Malaysian boards. This meagre fraction 
of women on corporate boards fetches the attention of firms and regulatory 
authorities to increase the number of female directors for observing their 
substantial impact on firm performance. Still, this result is parallel to the study of 
Cabrera-Fernández et al. (2016).
In addition, out of four CSR dimensions, only marketplace is found to be 
significantly and negatively related to ROA and positively related to EPS, whereas 
the remaining three aspects of CSR, namely environment, community and 
workplace, do not influence firm performance. The probable explanation for the 
negative relationship between marketplace dimension and firm performance is 
that an organisation discloses information about CSR practices because it has to 
maintain its legitimacy for survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), therefore negatively 
affecting firm performance. Moreover, over-investment hypothesis (Barnea & 
Rubin, 2010) asserts managers may overinvest in CSR activities to hide their 
financial misconducts and leave firms in agency costs. Alternatively, the positive 
relationship between marketplace and EPS indicates that activities performed for 
marketplace in Malaysia are creating a positive market value and fetching the 
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interests of investors in the firms. Moreover, this positive relationship is in 
accordance with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), presuming primary 
objective of firms is to meet various stakeholders’ interests. However, these 
findings are consistent with the findings of Yusoff and Adamu (2016) and 
Simionescu and Gherghina (2014).
Concerning control variables, firm size is positively related to performance, 
implying larger firm size brings attention of investors and depositors to maintain 
their trust. Moreover, economies of scale cause firms to get resources at cheaper 
cost and at larger diversification, positively influencing firm performance (Ahmed 
& Mubaraq, 2015; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015; Ofoeda, 2017). In the end, 
leverage is negatively associated with ROE, confirming the predictions of Jensen 
(1993) that debt is the potential cause of conflicts of interest where managers use 
higher debts to camouflage their financial wrongdoings, dropping a firm in 
potential cost position, hence negatively affecting performance (Muttakin & 
Subramaniam, 2015).
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study attempts to investigate the legitimate role of corporate 
boards and CSR on the performance of Malaysian listed companies. The main 
findings of the study reveal larger board size and higher board independence 
positively affect firm performance and significantly legitimise the board role in 
firms. However, women’s representation on Malaysian corporate boards does not 
legitimate the firm performance due to their meagre proportion on boards, 
therefore insignificantly affecting firm performance. Additionally, out of four 
CSR dimensions, only marketplace is found to be positively and significantly 
related to EPS and negatively and significantly related to ROA. Conversely, 
environment, community and workplace dimensions are found to be insignificantly 
related to all performance measures, setting down firms in a questionable 
legitimate state. More importantly, the results of the study are consistent with 
earlier theories, namely resource dependence theory, agency theory, stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory. These findings have implications for practitioners 
as well as academicians. Practically, this study is important for Bursa Malaysia, 
Securities Commission Malaysia, investors, depositors and managers for 
examining the compliance of Corporate Governance Code and CSR disclosure 
framework. Conspicuously, this study emphasises the legitimate role of corporate 
boards and CSR on the performance of Malaysian listed companies to bring new 
facets in the literature of corporate legitimacy.
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